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Hume’s Perceptions and the Burden of Representation 
 Throughout A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume seems to suggest that some 
perceptions of the mind have the capability to represent, but he is not completely explicit 
regarding which perceptions are capable of representing.  His account of impressions and ideas 
leaves some room to speculate about which perceptions can represent, and which possess 
intentional content: ideas are considered to represent, but are not intrinsically representative, and 
impressions may represent, but passions cannot.1 Because Hume’s distinction between 
impressions and ideas is by and large considered a strictly phenomenal one, the question of 
which perceptions can represent is frustratingly convoluted. In this paper, I will focus on 
impressions and argue that none of Hume’s impressions are capable of representing, due to the 
primacy of impressions and the gap between experience and reflection. Furthermore, I will argue 
that my position does not contradict Hume’s position that the only difference between types of 
perceptions is rooted in their force or vivacity. In order to do so, I begin by giving a short 
account of impressions and ideas, explaining the differences in types of impressions. I will argue 
that Hume’s account of idea formation and the passions renders it impossible for impressions to 
represent, and that representation belongs strictly in the domain of ideas. Once I have made my 
argument, I will defend it from the objection that ideas can and do represent, and since ideas and 
impressions are only distinguished by their force and vivacity, impressions also represent. 
Furthermore, I will defend my position against an argument that Don Garrett makes in his paper 
“Hume’s Naturalistic Theory of Representation.” Garrett suggests that moral and aesthetic 
                                                 
1
 For the purposes of this paper, ‘represent’ means to stand for or symbolize, and ‘intentional content’ refers to the 
contents of the perception that are about or directed at the subject being represented.  
  
sentiments, species of secondary impressions, can represent in the same manner as impressions 
of color.  
 I will begin by giving Hume’s account of perceptions. Hume declares that “all the 
perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds” which he labels 
impressions and ideas (T 1.1.1.1).2  Impressions are “all our sensations, passion and emotions, as 
they make their first appearance in the soul,” and ideas are the “faint images” of impressions 
present in thinking and reasoning (T 1.1.1.1). He repeatedly asserts that impressions are always 
antecedent to ideas that ideas are copies of impressions, and that these ideas represent that which 
they are derived from (T1.1.1.12). Furthermore, Hume claims that the only difference between 
impressions and ideas lies in the “degrees of force and liveliness” with which they appear to the 
mind (T1.1.1.1).  He posits that impressions and ideas can either be simple or complex. Simple 
perceptions are those that “admit of no distinction or separation” and complex perceptions can be 
broken down into parts (T 1.1.1.2).  
 Hume further divides impressions into original and secondary, also known as impressions 
of sensation and reflection, respectively.3 Hume does not give a detailed account of impressions 
of sensation, as he asserts that “the examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists” 
(T1.1.2.1). He instead gives a thorough account of secondary impressions. Hume defines original 
and secondary impressions in the following passage: 
Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without 
any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of 
the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to 
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 References to “T” are of (Hume 2000) with the book, part, section, and paragraph numbers. 
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 Hume initially distinguishes impressions into impressions of sensation and reflection in 1.1.2, but later in 2.1.1 he 
resolves this distinction into original and secondary.  
  
the external organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as 
proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by 
the interposition of its idea.  Of the first kind are all the impressions of 
the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the 
passions, and other emotions resembling them (T 2.1.1.1).  
What Hume means here is that original impressions are not reliant upon preceding impressions 
or ideas; they are foundational in this sense. Secondary impressions, by contrast, arise from ideas 
or original impressions, and are dependent upon them. It seems appropriate for Hume to refer to 
some secondary impressions as “reflective” because there is always some post-reflective or 
extra-experiential component involved in their creation.4 Original impressions are pre-reflective 
and experientially radical. 
  Hume begins his treatment of the passions by dividing them into direct and indirect. He 
defines the direct passions as those arising “immediately from good or evil, from pain or 
pleasure.” Hume asserts that the indirect passions derive from the same principles as the direct, 
but with “the conjunction of other qualities” (T 2.1.2.4).  Hume gives a thorough account of the 
indirect passions, but is very brief with the direct passions, citing that “none of the direct 
affections seem to merit our particular attention, except hope and fear” (T 2.3.9.9). 
 Hume considers desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security to be direct 
passions. The indirect passions include pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, 
malice and generosity. It is important to note that Hume explicitly states that the passions do not 
represent; he asserts that “a passion is an original existence…and contains not any representative 
quality” (T 2.3.3.5). Here I will focus on the more thorough account of the indirect passions to 
explicate how they acquire intentional content.  
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 Not all secondary impressions are impressions of reflection; some secondary impressions arise from other original 
impressions, independent from the consideration of ideas.  
  
 Hume explains his account of the indirect passions by using the familiar notions of pride 
and humility. He asserts that pride and humility have the same object: the self. Hume stresses 
that the object and the cause of these passions cannot be the same, so he seeks to distinguish 
between the two. He states that one idea will produce a passion, and that the passion “turns our 
view to another idea” (T 2.1.2.4). The first idea is the cause of the passion, and the second is the 
object of the passion.  Regarding the cause of a passion, Hume makes a distinction between the 
quality, which stimulates the passion, and the subject in which the quality occurs. Furthermore, 
he posits that the subject must be in some sort of relation to us, otherwise the quality would not 
stimulate the passion. To illustrate this in the case of pride, Hume gives us an example of a 
beautiful house. If I am proud of my beautiful house, the cause of my pride is the beautiful 
house. The quality of the cause in this case is beauty, and the subject is my house (a house that is 
related to me via possession). I am the object in this example. There is nothing in the passion 
itself that represents. The idea of “my beautiful house” may cause the passion of pride, but the 
intentional content belongs to the idea itself. My pride is directed at me, making it an intentional 
state, but the pride itself does not possess intentional content. The pride does not represent the 
beauty, the house, or any combination of the two. It is most important to note that Hume states 
that “a relation of impressions is requisite to these passions” (T 2.2.1.8).  
 . For something to be represented, a relation is required—a representation is a 
representation of something; this indicates a relation between the two. The representation needs 
to resemble or otherwise be connected to the thing being represented. Here I will argue that some 
process of thought or consideration is requisite for a “relation.” Hume explains relations as such, 
with the former relation being natural, and the latter being philosophical: 
  
The word relation is commonly us’d in two senses considerably 
different from each other. Either for that quality, by which two ideas 
are connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally 
introduces the other... or for that particular circumstance, in which, 
even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think 
proper to compare them (T1.1.5.1).  
From the language Hume uses here, it is evident that there is some sort of thinking going on in 
relating one idea to another. With natural relations, it is something that the imagination does 
automatically; with the philosophical relations, it is something that the mind can willingly do. 
This characterization of philosophical relations indicates a process of thinking or consideration; 
in order for me to compare one thing to another, I must consider things about them. The role of 
consideration in the natural relations is less obvious, because one idea “involuntarily” introduces 
another (Owen, 80). It seems as if the involuntary nature of the transition between ideas would 
preclude consideration or thinking. In fact, Hume does use the term imagination in a somewhat 
loose and inexact manner throughout the Treatise, but it seems as if he intends it to be considered 
as some sort of thinking. He states that “the imagination has the command over all its ideas, and 
can, join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible” (T1.3.7.7). The imagination deals 
with ideas, recall that ideas are “the faint images of [impressions] in thinking and reasoning” (T 
1.1.1.1).  It seems as if consideration or thought is necessary when dealing with relations of 
ideas. In order for one thing to represent another, these things must stand in a relation with one 
another, and this relation requires some form of consideration whether implicit or explicit.  
 It follows from all this, that if original impressions are experientially radical, and pre-
reflective; they cannot be put into a relation with something it is purported to represent. Since 
secondary impressions necessarily rely on preceding perceptions (whether through an idea or 
original impression) it is clear that the impressions cannot represent on their own. Ideas and 
  
secondary impressions are dependent upon pre-reflective experience. Pre-reflective experience 
cannot have representative content, because this would require some kind of consideration of the 
content. The representing comes into play through relations, and this occurs after reflection. I am 
not suggesting that impressions do not have content, they must have experiential content, but the 
point is that the content of an impression cannot represent. The experiential content is 
represented by an idea related to the impression. So all impressions, including passions, only 
acquire representative content by having an idea associated with them.  
 To illustrate my argument, consider the following example. While walking down the 
street, I am struck and injured by a red car. I have original impressions of the pain, of the red, of 
the extension and body of the car, and the sounds that are made during the event. These are 
simple impressions that are copied as simple ideas. According to Hume’s system, these simple 
ideas get joined together by the imagination and become complex ideas. The ideas represent the 
impressions they are derived from. So my idea of the red car is a complex idea that links and 
represents my impressions of the red and the car. 
  After I heal from my injuries, I am walking down a street and I perceive a red car. Again, 
I have impressions of red and car, these are again original impressions. These impressions 
become the complex idea of red car, and I have an idea of pain associated with the idea of red 
car. Recall that direct passions are considered secondary impressions, and cannot arise without 
the assistance of original impressions or ideas associated with them. My idea of the red car is 
associated with the idea of my impression of the pain I experienced when struck by a red car, and 
I therefore experience fear. In this example, my impression of red and car do not represent 
anything, the simple ideas of red and car  represent the concept of ‘something that has the 
  
quality of the color red’ and ‘something that is a car.’ These ideas are linked by the one or more 
principle of association and become the idea of ‘red car.’ My experience of fear does not 
represent anything, but the passion has the complex idea that represents “that time I was struck 
and injured by a red car” annexed to it. This is how this instance of my fear acquires 
representational content. This example illustrates how impressions lack their own representative 
content, and acquire content by being attached to an associated idea. The onus of representation 
belongs to ideas, not to impressions.  
 This argument may raise the following concern. If the only difference between 
impressions and ideas is force, and ideas clearly represent something, then why suggest that 
impressions cannot represent?  First, recall that impressions are experienced prior to ideas. 
Second, Hume does not assert that all ideas intrinsically represent (Garrett, 307-308). If ideas do 
not intrinsically represent, then there is not a problem with saying that impressions do not 
represent. Since simple ideas are copies of simple impressions, then it makes sense to say that 
ideas represent without assuming that impressions have to. After all, a copy is a representation of 
something. This distinction is most clear in regards to original impressions, following that 
original impressions are pre-reflective; unless we reflect on something, how can we be aware of 
its content? Since secondary impressions arise from original impressions or ideas, we can 
reasonably conclude that they are at least associated with intentional content without assuming 
that they have content of their own. If we recall that the basic difference between impressions 
and ideas is the difference between “thinking and feeling,” then this line of thought becomes 
clearer (T 1.1.1.1).  
  
 Don Garrett’s account of secondary impressions presents another challenge to my 
argument. Don Garrett asserts that at least some impressions of reflection are capable of 
representing. He claims that: 
Moral and aesthetic sentiments (which are like the passions in being 
impressions of reflection) are also typically associated with ideas 
having representational content; but these sentiments may, in 
addition, be regarded as themselves representing, in at least some 
way, the particular qualities—such as virtue and vice, beauty and 
deformity—that, on his account, their occurrence allows us to “sense” 
(Garrett, 303). 
Garrett posits that moral sentiments may represent moral qualities in the same manner as an 
impression of color represents the quality in the object that produces the impression. Garrett’s 
position is untenable if we take two things into account: that an impression of color cannot 
represent anything, and that Hume describes the “sense” of virtue as something requiring 
consideration.  
 First, recall the primacy of original impressions. An impression of a color is an 
impression of sensation, and does not represent. The impression is an experience of something, 
the idea that is copied from the impression possesses intentional content. Furthermore, even if 
impression of sensations could represent anything, it is impossible to know what it is a 
representation of. Without some sort of relation to the object per se, the representation cannot be 
a representation; Hume asserts that the causes of impressions of sensation are “perfectly 
inexplicable by human reason” and there is no way to be certain that they actually represent the 
object they purport to represent (T 1.3.5.2).  Garrett’s comparison of moral sentiments and 
impression of color is an inappropriate analogy and does not support his position.  
  
 Second, Hume states that “to have a sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of 
a particular kind from the contemplation of a character” (T 3.1.2.3). Here, Garrett’s position runs 
into the problem of Hume’s distinction between thinking and feeling. The “contemplation of a 
character” is some sort of consideration of ideas associated with said character, and the result is 
an impression of reflection that causes us to feel a certain way. Furthermore, Hume posits that 
“in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous” 
(3.1.2.3). So the sense that something is virtuous is another impression of reflection that is 
augmented by ideas. Garrett’s assertion that moral sentiments can represent qualities of virtue 
seems to conflate the idea of “satisfaction of a particular kind” with the experience of 
“satisfaction of a particular kind.”  
 To conclude, my argument that impressions cannot represent does presuppose that some 
process of consideration is required for a representation to occur; the notion that representation 
relies on relations bears a considerable amount of weight in my argument. This notion is a 
plausible one in the context of Hume’s system. Hume’s impressions are incapable of 
representing or having intentional content without the assistance of corresponding ideas. This is 
because representation requires some sort of relation between the representation and the 
represented. The relation cannot occur outside of some sort of consideration, to which ideas are 
requisite. Original impressions are experientially radical, thus all ideas and secondary 
impressions rely on them for their existence. Ideas do not inherently represent, but are instead 
prone to representing because of the nature of their creation; they are copies of correspondent 
impressions.  
  
 At first glance, Hume’s conception of ideas and impressions characterize ideas as a mere 
dilution of impressions. Since ideas can represent, then it would follow that impressions can as 
well. This is not the case, because impressions do not go through a formation process like that of 
ideas. Original impressions are primary and “without any introduction make their appearance in 
the soul,” and are the basis for ideas (T 2.1.1.2). Impressions of sensation, according to Hume, 
spring from inexplicable and inaccessible causes; they may be derived from an object, the human 
imagination or illusion of the senses (T 1.3.5.2). Regardless of where original impressions come 
from, Hume’s view seems to be that they are the foundation of our ideas. Our ideas are copies of 
our impressions; it is the responsibility of the ideas to represent their correspondent impressions 
and to accommodate intentional content. 
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